In the Bayan Obo mine with minerals of the Bayan Obo with minerals of the Bayan Obo is to be seen in the inner Mongolia, China.
China Stringer Network | Reuters
In April 2025, China imposed seven elements for rare and constant magnets that come from them – materials that form the basis of modern life and modern warfare. Fighter planes, rockets, electric vehicles, drones, wind turbines and even data centers rely on high -performance magnets of these critical minerals. Due to the restriction of its river, Beijing not only pressed its industrial muscles, but also revealed the American and remaining dangerous susceptibility to security in the world. China's latest actions show their willingness and ability to weapons American and global dependency.
This is not a new challenge. The United States have known for over 15 years that their critical mineral supply chains were too concentrated, too fragile and exposed to Chinese levers and control. And yet we have not reacted with urgency or coherence throughout the democratic and republican administration. Now the consequences of this failure have packed us on the neck and cascaded over our trading and defense sectors.
After the London talks, Washington and Beijing announced a new trade frame on Friday, under which China will resume the approval of export licenses for rare earths in the next six months. US officials have praised the breakthrough in public – but only a few details about what was given in return. This remains unanswered: what were the US compromises? How is the deal implemented? And what happens when the six months have expired?
Skepticism is high. Ford recently stabbed the production in his work in Chicago due to a magnet deficiency that even short-term care interruptions have real consequences. Paper agreements are not supply chain solutions. Without transparency, timely permits and long -term planning, this could easily become another diplomatic cycle from one step forward, two steps back.
Even this limited postponement consists of risks. Dozens of companies in Europe and North America have described China's export license process as extremely invasive. Companies must submit detailed production data, end consumption applications, furnishing images, customer names and transaction stories. Some applicants were refused because they do not provide photos or documentation of their end users.
Managers say that the process of “official information extraction” corresponds.
While the companies are recommended not to share sensitive IP, important details can mean indefinite delays. For companies in defense supply chains, the effects of alarming are: valuable commercial intelligence could be used to map competitors, disturb the pricing or to promote Chinese substitutes.
This is not just a licensing – it is competitive surveillance. And until the United States builds a safe, independent capacity in the critical minerals, it remains exposed to both disturbances and data risk.
This vulnerability did not appear overnight. Many have been watching this long -collector pulling wreck for years. In 2010, China cut off the export of rare earth to Japan during a maritime dispute, a clear warning shot, the United States observed. In 2014, the Obama government won a WTO case against China's export restrictions, but incorrectly assumed that legal success would deter further manipulations.
What Trump did, bid
The first Trump administration identified rare earths as critical, but frees them in particular from the China tariffs from 2018, possibly as unspoken recognition for the dependency on US. Biden continued to date the most structured approach: Executive Order 14017, the critical mineral working group and the financing of IIJA and IRA. Strategic partnerships such as the mineral security partnership were created. However, progress was slow, disabled by the permission of delays and uneven allies.
The second Trump administration has returned with more aggressive measures that call in Section 232, activate the law on defense production and propose major funding increases in the 2026 financial year. A National Energy Dominance Council now coordinates the efforts. But these measures, such as China's six -month exhaustion, are still rejected Beijing's handle. And the defense sector remains decisive without such a license window.
The latest G7 summit in Canada underlined the global missions. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, accused China directly of “armed” his control over important materials such as rare earths and called for a reaction from the United G7. The result: a G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan. Although China was not mentioned by name, the undertext was unmistakable. The plan obliges G7 members to increase ESG and traceability standards for important resources. Mobilize capital for new projects in critical mineral reduction and processing; And work together with innovations in recycling, substitution and refinery technologies.
Beijing reacted predictably with anger. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the plan as a “pretext” for protectionism and claimed that the G7 was out of fear of losing market shares.
Brussels now signals that trade negotiations with Beijing are effectively stalling, so that the opportunities of Chinese retaliation – especially against the EU – rise. When China doubles, it risks to drive the EU, Japan, South Korea and India closer to the Washington orbit – exactly what Beijing wants to avoid.
China's dominant position in the rare Earth -Mining
The raw numbers are amazing. China accounts for around 70% of the global rare mining, but over 90% of the refiner capacity. It produces 92% of the worldwide neodymium-iron boron magnets (NDFEB)-in everything, from submarines to Teslas. This dominance is no coincidence. China subsidized the processing, concentrated on global acquisitions in the entire supply chain and scales the production much faster than approving the West and issuing permits for a single mine.
US website like MP materials'Mountain Pass and Round Top remain incomplete without downstream processing. The DOD and DOE offered grants and the Trump budget for the 2026 financial year is intended to expand the US mining capacity and secure access to critical minerals. However, all of this remains in the shade after the China Head Start and the long -standing industrial command and the control of the sector.
The mountain pass rare earth and processing plant, in the possession of MP materials, in Mountain Pass, California.
George Rose | Getty Images News | Getty pictures
China moved early and determined in Africa and Latin America and worked with governments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bolivia and Chile. Investments in ports, rails and refinery infrastructure. In contrast, the US efforts and the commitment to these topics were pieces and valvant, transparency and governance, important problems, but in fact important problems, but a limited dynamic of critical mineral problems. Even the youngest mous with Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo remain symbolic, disabled by conflicts and instability in these countries.
The London talks and recent progress in the commercial business bought time. But time without strategy is not fertile. China's license regime is still intact, his data must be unabated. The defense sector remains excluded. In the meantime, the threat to the withdrawal of Clean Energy and Industrial Policy Funding could bring rare environmental projects to a standstill at the time of the indictment.
This is a crucial moment. China Wetten that the internal division of America – between workers, industry, environmentalists, tribal nations and political factions – will prevent the kind of uniform, persistent effort that are necessary for the competition. You can be right. The United States has to prove that they are wrong.
Critical minerals are geopolitical power
The United States now do not have to treat critical minerals as goods, but as instruments of geopolitical power. China does it. The escape of his grip requires more than my permits and short -term funds. It requires a coherent, long -term strategy to build a complete supply chain that not only includes domestic skills, but also reliable allies and partners. From mining and refinement to magnetic production and recycling, any connection must be strengthened through targeted investments, enabling reforms and strategic coordination.
A successful and sustainable policy requires the commitment from one presidency to the next. The United States cannot afford allies and partners only rhetorically. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile and Indonesia (among other things) have to be sustainable partnerships that are supported by financing, technology transmission and critical infrastructure investments, not just our lectures on the government.
The six-month export frighten from China is not a solution-it is a stress test. It shows whether the United States can finally concentrate and act or whether it is withdrawn in complacency. Beijing sets it, it will be the latter. Washington has to react with urgency, unity and a strategy that corresponds to the extent of the challenge. It's still time, but not much.
– by Dewirtric McNeal, Managing Director and Senior Policy Analyst at Longview Global and a CNBC employee
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